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Abstract
People today typically use multiple online social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Google+, LinkedIn,
etc.). Each online network represents a subset of their “real” ego-networks. An interesting and
challenging problem is to reconcile these online networks, that is, to identify all the accounts be-
longing to the same individual. Besides providing a richer understanding of social dynamics, the
problem has a number of practical applications. At first sight, this problem appears algorithmically
challenging. Fortunately, a small fraction of individuals explicitly link their accounts across multiple
networks; our work leverages these connections to identify a very large fraction of the network.
Our main contributions are to mathematically formalize the problem for the first time, and
to design a simple, local, and efficient parallel algorithm to solve it. We are able to prove strong
theoretical guarantees on the algorithm’s performance on well-established network models (Random
Graphs, Preferential Attachment). We also experimentally confirm the effectiveness of the algorithm
on synthetic and real social network data sets.
1 Introduction
The advent of online social networks has generated a renaissance in the study of social behaviors and
in the understanding of the topology of social interactions. For the first time, it has become possible
to analyze networks and social phenomena on a world-wide scale and to design large-scale experiments
on them. This new evolution in social science has been the center of much attention, but has also
attracted a lot of critiques; in particular, a longstanding problem in the study of online social networks
is to understand the similarity between them and “real” underlying social networks [29].
This question is particularly challenging because online social networks are often just a realization
of a subset of real social networks. For example, Facebook “friends” are a good representation of the
personal acquaintances of a user, but probably a poor representation of her working contacts, while
LinkedIn is a good representation of work contacts but not a very good representation of personal
relationships. Therefore, analyzing social behaviors in any of these networks has the drawback that
the results would only be partial. Furthermore, even if certain behavior can be observed in several
networks, there are still serious problems because there is no systematic way to combine the behavior
of a specific user across different social networks and because some social relationships will not appear
in any social network. For these reasons, identifying all the accounts belonging to the same individual
across different social services is a fundamental step in the study of social science.
Interestingly, the problem has also very important practical implications. First, having a deeper
understanding of the characteristics of a user across different networks helps to construct a better
portrait of her, which can be used to serve personalized content or advertisements. In addition, having
information about connections of a user across multiple networks would make it easier to construct
tools such as “friend suggestion” or “people you may want to follow”.
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The problem of identifying users across online social networks (also referred to as the social net-
work reconciliation problem) has been studied extensively using machine learning techniques; several
heuristics have been proposed to tackle it. However, to the best of our knowledge, it has not yet been
studied formally and no rigorous results have been proved for it. One of the contributions of our work
is to give a formal definition of the problem, which is a precursor to mathematical analysis. Such a
definition requires two key components: A model of the “true” underlying social network, and a model
for how each online social network is formed as a subset of this network. We discuss details of our
models in Section 3.
Another possible reason for the lack of mathematical analysis is that natural definitions of the
problem are demotivatingly similar to the graph isomorphism problem.1 In addition, at first sight
the social network reconciliation problem seems even harder because we are not looking just for
isomorphism but for similar structures, as distinct social networks are not identical. Fortunately,
when reconciling social networks, we have two advantages over general graph isomorphism: First,
real social networks are not the adversarially designed graphs which are hard instances of graph
isomorphism, and second, a small fraction of social network users explicitly link their accounts across
multiple networks.
The main goal of this paper is to design an algorithm with provable guarantees that is simple,
parallelizable and robust to malicious users. For real applications, this last property is fundamental,
and often underestimated by machine learning models.2 In fact, the threat of malicious users is so
prominent that large social networks (Twitter, Google+, Facebook) have introduced the notion of
‘verification’ for celebrities.
Our first contribution is to give a formal model for the graph reconciliation problem that captures
the hardness of the problem and the notion of an initial set of trusted links identifying users across
different networks. Intuitively, our model postulates the existence of a true underlying graph, then
randomly generates 2 realizations of it which are perturbations of the initial graph, and a set of
trusted links for some users. Given this model, our next significant contribution is to design a simple,
parallelizable algorithm (based on similar intuition to the algorithm in [23]) and to prove formally
that our algorithm solves the graph reconciliation problem if the underlying graph is generated by
well established network models. It is important to note that our algorithm relies on graph structure
and the initial set of links of users across different networks in such a way that in order to circumvent
it, an attacker must be able to have a lot of friends in common with the user under attack. Thus it
is more resilient to attack than much of the previous work on this topic. Finally, we note that any
mathematical model is, by necessity, a simplification of reality, and hence it is important to empirically
validate the effectiveness of our approach when the assumptions of our models are not satisfied. In
Section 5, we measure the performance of our algorithm on several synthetic and “real” data sets.
We also remark that for various applications, it may be possible to improve on the performance
of our algorithm by adding heuristics based on domain-specific knowledge. For example, we later
discuss identifying common Wikipedia articles across languages; in this setting, machine translation
of article titles can provide an additional useful signal. However, an important message of this paper
is that a simple, efficient and scalable algorithm that does not take any domain-specific information
into account can achieve excellent results for mathematically sound reasons.
1In graph theory, an isomorphism between two graphs G and H is a bijection, f(∗), between the vertex sets of G and
H such that any two vertices u and v of G are adjacent in G if and only if f(u) and f(v) are adjacent in H. The graph
isomorphism problem is: Given two graphs G and G′ find an isomorphism between them or determine that there is no
isomorphism. The graph isomorphism problem is considered very hard, and no polynomial algorithms are known for it.
2Approaches based largely on features of a user (such as her profile) and her neighbors can easily be tricked by a
malicious user, who can create a profile locally identical to the attacked user.
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2 Related Work
The problem of identifying Internet users was introduced to identify users across different chat groups
or web sessions in [24, 27]. Both papers are based on similar intuition, using writing style (stylography
features) and a few semantic features to identify users. The social network reconciliation problem
was introduced more recently by Zafarani and Liu in [33]. The main intuition behind their paper is
that users tend to use similar usernames across multiple social networks, and even when different,
search engines find the corresponding names. To improve on these first naive approaches, several
machine learning models were developed [3, 17, 20, 25, 28], all of which collect several features of the
users (name, location, image, connections topology), based on which they try to identify users across
networks. These techniques may be very fragile with respect to malicious users, as it is not hard to
create a fake profile with similar characteristics. Furthermore, they get lower precision experimentally
than our algorithm achieves. However, we note that these techniques can be combined with ours, both
to validate / increase the number of initial trusted links, and to further improve the performance of
our algorithm.
A different approach was studied in [22], where the authors infer missing attributes of a user in
an online social network from the attribute information provided by other users in the network. To
achieve their results, they retrieve communities, identify the main attribute of a community and then
spread this attribute to all the user in the community. Though it is interesting, this approach suffers
from the same limitations of the learning techniques discussed above.
Recently, Henderson et al. [14] studied which are the most important features to identify a node
in a social network, focusing only on graph structure information. They analyzed several features of
each ego-network, and also added the notion of recursive features on nodes at distance larger than 1
from a specific node. It is interesting to notice that their recursive features are more resilient to attack
by malicious users, although they can be easily circumvented by the attacker typically assumed in the
social network security literature [32], who can create arbitrarily many nodes.
The problem of reconciling social networks is closely connected to the problem of de-anonymizing
social networks. Backstrom et al. introduced the problem of deanonymizing social networks in [4]. In
their paper, they present 2 main techniques: An active attack (nodes are added to the network before
the network is anonymized), and a second passive one. Our setting is similar to that described in
their passive attack. In this setting the authors are able to design a heuristic with good experimental
results; though their technique is very interesting, it is somewhat elaborate and does not have a
provable guarantee.
In the context of de-anonymizing social networks, the work of Narayanan and Shmatikov [23] is
closely related. Their algorithm is similar in spirit to ours; they look at the number of common
neighbors and other statistics, and then they keep all the links above a specific threshold. There
are two main differences between our work and theirs. First, we formulate the problem and the
algorithm mathematically and we are able to prove theoretical guarantees for our algorithm. Second,
to improve the precision of their algorithm in [23] the authors construct a scoring function that is
expansive to compute. In fact the complexity of their algorithm is O((E1 + E2)∆1∆2), where E1
and E2 are the number of edges in the two graphs and ∆1 and ∆2 are the maximum degree in the
2 graphs. Thus their algorithm would be too slow to run on Twitter and Facebook, for example;
Twitter has more than 200M users, several of whom have degree more than 20M and Facebook more
than 1B users with several users of degree 5K. Instead, in our work we are able to show that a very
simple technique based on degree bucketing combined with the number of common neighbors suffices
to guarantee strong theoretical guarantees and good experimental results. In this way we designed an
algorithm with sequential complexity O((E1 +E2)min(∆1,∆2) log(max(∆1,∆2))) that can be run in
O(log(max(∆1,∆2))) MapReduce rounds. In this context, our paper can be seen as the first really
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scalable algorithm for network de-anonymization with theoretical guarantees. Further, we also obtain
considerably higher precision experimentally, though a perfect comparison across different datasets is
not possible. The different contexts also are important: In de-anonymization, the precision of 72%
they report corresponds to a significant violation of user privacy. In contrast, we focus on the benefits
to users of linking accounts; in a user-facing application, suggesting an account with a 28% chance of
error is unlikely to be acceptable.
Finally, independently from our work, Yartseva and Grossglauser [31] recently studied a very
similar model focusing only on networks generated by the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph model.
3 Model and Algorithm
In this section, we first describe our formal model and its parameters. We then describe our algorithm
and discuss the intuition behind it.
3.1 Model
Recall that a formal definition of the user identification problem requires first a model for the “true”
underlying social network G(V,E) that captures relationships between people. However, we cannot
directly observe this network; instead, we consider two imperfect realizations or copies G1(V,E1) and
G2(V,E2) with E1, E2 ⊆ E. Second, we need a model for how edges of E are selected for the two
copies E1 and E2. This model must capture the fact that users do not necessarily replicate their entire
personal networks on any social networking service, but only a subset.
Any such mathematical models are necessarily imperfect descriptions of reality, and as models
become more ‘realistic’, they become more mathematically intractable. In this paper, we consider
certain well-studied models, and provide complete proofs. It is possible to generalize our mathematical
techniques to some variants of these models; for instance, with small probability, the two copies could
have new “noise” edges not present in the original network G(V,E), or vertices could be deleted in
the copies. We do not fully analyze these as the generalizations require tedious calculations without
adding new insights. Our experimental results of Section 5 show that the algorithm performs well
even in real networks where the formal mathematical assumptions are not satisfied.
For the underlying social network, our main focus is on the preferential attachment model [5],
which is historically the most cited model for social networks. Though the model does not capture
some features of real social networks, the key properties we use for our analysis are those common
to online social networks such as a skewed degree distribution, and the fact that nodes have distinct
neighbors including some long-range / random connections not shared with those immediately around
them[13, 15]. In the experimental section we will consider also different models and also real social
networks as our underline real networks.
For the two imperfect copies of the underlying network we assume that G1 (respectively G2)
is created by selecting each edge e ∈ E of the original graph G(V,E) independently with a fixed
probability s1 (resp. s2) (See Figure 1.) In the real world, edges/relationships are not selected truly
independently, but this serves as a reasonable approximation for observed networks. In fact, a similar
model has been previously considered by [26], which also produced experimental evidence from an
email network to support the independent random selection of edges. Another plausible mechanism
for edge creation in social network is the cascade model, in which nodes are more likely to join a new
network if more of their friends have joined it. Experimentally, we show that our algorithm performs
even better in the cascade model than in the independent edge deletion model.
These two models are theoretically interesting and practically interesting [26]. Nevertheless, in
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some cases the analyzed social networks may differ in their scopes and so the group of friends that a
user has in a social network can greatly differ from the group of friends that same user has in the other
network. To capture this scenario in the experimental section, we also consider the Affiliation Network
model [19] (in which users participate in a number of communities) as the underlying social network.
For each of G1, G2, and for each community, we keep or delete all the edges inside the community
with constant probability. This highly correlated edge deletion process captures the fact that a user’s
personal friends might be connected to her on one network, while her work colleagues are connected
on the second network. We defer the detailed description of this experiment to Section 5.
Recall that the user identification problem, given only the graph information, is intractable in
general graphs. Even the special case where s1 = s2 = 1 (that is, no edges have been deleted) is
equivalent to the well-studied Graph Isomorphism problem, for which no polynomial-time algorithm
is known. Fortunately, in reality, there are additional sources of information which allow one to identify
a subset of nodes across the two networks: For example, people can use the same email address to
sign up on multiple websites. Users often explicitly connect their network accounts, for instance by
posting a link to their Facebook profile page on Google+ or Twitter and vice versa. To model this,
we assume that there is a set of users/nodes explicitly linked across the two networks G1, G2. More
formally, there is a linking probability l (typically, l is a small constant) and each node in V is linked
across the networks independently with probability l. (In real networks, nodes may be linked with
differing probabilities, but high-degree nodes / celebrities may be more likely to connect their accounts
and engage in cross-network promotions; this would be more likely to help our algorithm, since low-
degree nodes are less valuable as seeds because they help identify only a small number of neighbors.
In the experiments of [23], the authors explicitly consider high-degree nodes as seeds in the real-world
experiments.)
In Section 3.2 below, we present a natural algorithm to solve the user identification problem with a
set of linked nodes, and discuss some of its properties. Then, in Section 4, we prove that this algorithm
performs well on several well-established network models. In Section 5, we show that the algorithm
also works very well in practice, by examining its performance on real-world networks.
3.2 The Algorithm
To solve the user identification problem, we design a local distributed algorithm that uses only struc-
tural information about the graphs to expand the initial set of links into a mapping/identification of
a large fraction of the nodes in the two networks.
Before describing the algorithm, we introduce a useful definition.
Definition 1. A pair of nodes (u1, u2) with u1 ∈ G1, u2 ∈ G2 is said to be a similarity witness for a
pair (v1, v2) with v1 ∈ G1, v2 ∈ G2 if u1 ∈ N1(v1), u2 ∈ N2(v2) and u1 has been linked to / identified
with u2.
Here, N1(v1) denotes the neighborhood of v1 in G1, and similarly N2(v2) denotes the neighborhood
of v2 in G2.
Roughly speaking, in each phase of the algorithm, every pair of nodes (one from each network)
computes an similarity score that is equal to the number of similarity witnesses they have. We then
create a link between two nodes v1 and v2 if v2 is the node in G2 with maximum similarity score to
v1 and vice versa. We then use the newly generated set of links as input to the next phase of the
algorithm.
A possible risk of this algorithm is that in early phases, when few nodes in the network have been
linked, low-degree nodes could be mis-matched. To avoid this (improving precision), in the ith phase,
we only allow nodes of degree roughly D/2i and above to be matched, where D is a parameter related
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Figure 1: From the real underlying social network, the model generates two random realizations of it,
A and B, and some identification links for a subset of the users across the two realizations
to the largest node degree. Thus, in the first phase, we match only the nodes of very high degree,
and in subsequent phases, we gradually decrease the degree threshold required for matching. In the
experimental section we will show in fact that this simple step is very effective, reducing the error rate
by more than 33%. We summarize the algorithm, that we called User-Matching, as follows:
Input:
G1(V,E1), G2(V,E2), L a set of initial identification links
across the networks, D the maximum degree in the graph
a minimum matching score T and a specified number of
iteration k.
Output:
A larger set of identification links across the networks.
Algorithm:
For i = 1, . . . , k
For j = logD, . . . , 1
For all the pairs (u, v) with u ∈ G1 and v ∈ G2
and such that dG1(u) ≥ 2j and dG2(v) ≥ 2j
Assign to (u, v) a score equal to the number
of similarity witnesses between u and v
If (u, v) is the pair with highest score in which
either u or v appear and the score is above T
add (u, v) to L.
Output L
Where dGi(u) is the degree of node u in Gi. Note that the internal for loop can be implemented effi-
ciently with 4 consecutive rounds of MapReduce, so the total running time would consist of O(k logD)
MapReductions. In the experiments, we note that even for a small constant k (1 or 2), the algorithm
returns very interesting results. The optimal choice of threshold T depends on the desired preci-
sion/recall tradeoff; higher choices of T improve precision, but in our experiments, we note that T = 2
or 3 is sufficient for very high precision.
4 Theoretical Results
In this section we formally analyze the performance of our algorithm on two network models. In
particular, we explain why our simple algorithm should be effective on real social networks. The
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core idea of the proofs and the algorithm is to leverage high degree nodes to discover all the possible
mapping between users. In fact, as we show here theoretically and later experimentally, high degree
nodes are easy to detect. Once we are able to detect the high degree nodes, most low degree nodes
can be identified using this information.
We start with the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (Random) Graph model [11] to warm up with the proofs, and to
explore the intuition behind the algorithm. Then we move to our main theoretical results, for the
Preferential Attachment Model. For simplicity of exposition, we assume throughout this section that
s1 = s2 = s; this does not change the proofs in any material detail.
4.1 Warm up: Random Graphs
In this section, we prove that if the underlying ‘true’ network is a random graph generated from the
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model (also known as G(n, p)), our algorithm identifies almost all nodes in the network
with high probability.
Formally, in the G(n, p) model, we start with an empty graph on n nodes, and insert each of the(
n
2
)
possible edges independently with probability p. We assume that p < 1/6; in fact, any constant
probability results in graphs which are much denser than any social network.3 Let G be a graph
generated by this process; given this underlying network G, we now construct two partial realizations
G1, G2 as described by our model of Section 3.
We note that the probability a specific edge exists in G1 or G2 is ps. Also, if nps is less than
(1 − ε) log n for ε > 0, the graphs G1 and G2 are not connected w.h.p. [11]. Therefore, we assume
that nps > c log n for some constant c.
In the following we identify the nodes in G1 with u1, . . . , un and the nodes in G2 with v1, . . . , vn,
where nodes ui and vi correspond to the same node i in G. In the first phase, the expected number
of similarity witnesses for a pair (ui, vi) is (n − 1)ps2 · l. This follows because the expected number
of neighbors of i in G is (n − 1)p, the probability that the edge to a given neighbor survives in both
G1 and G2 is s
2, and the probability that it is initially linked is l. On the other hand, the expected
number of similarity witnesses for a pair (ui, vj), with i 6= j is (n − 2)p2s2 · l; the additional factor
of p is because a given other node must have an edge to both i and j, which occurs with probability
p2. Thus, there is a factor of p difference between the expected number of similarity witnesses a node
ui has with its true match vi and with some other node vj , with i 6= j. The main intuition is that
this factor of p < 1 is enough to ensure the correctness of algorithm. We prove this by separately
considering two cases: If p is sufficiently large, the expected number of similarity witnesses is large,
and we can apply a concentration bound. On the other hand, if p is small, np2s2 is so small that the
expected number of similarity witnesses is almost negligible.
We start by proving that in the first case there is always a gap between a real and a false match.
Theorem 1. If (n−2)ps2l ≥ 24 log n (that is, p > 24
s2l
logn
n−2 ), w.h.p. the number of first-phase similarity
witnesses between ui and vi is at least (n − 1)ps2l/2. The number of first-phase similarity witnesses
between ui and vj, with i 6= j is w.h.p. at most (n− 2)ps2l/2.
Proof. We prove both parts of the lemma using Chernoff Bounds (see, for instance, [10]).
Let consider a pair for node j. Let Yi be a r.v. such that Yi = 1 if node ui ∈ N1(uj) and
vi ∈ N2(vj), and if (ui, vi) ∈ L, where L is the initial seed of links across G1 and G2. Then, we have
Pr[Y1 = 1] = ps
2l. If Y =
∑n−1
i=1 Yi, the Chernoff bound implies that Pr[Y < (1−δ)E[Y ]] ≤ e−E[Y ]δ
2/2.
3In fact, the proof works even with p = 1/2, but it requires more care. However, when p is too close to 1, G is close
to a clique and all nodes have near-identical neighborhoods, making it impossible to distinguish between them.
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That is,
Pr
[
Y <
1
2
(n− 1)ps2l
]
≤ e−E[Y ]/8 < e−3 logn = 1/n3
Now, taking the union bound over the n nodes in G, w.h.p. every node has the desired number of
first-phase similarity witnesses with its copy.
To prove the second part, suppose w.l.o.g. that we are considering the number of first-phase
similarity witnesses between ui and vj , with i 6= j. Let Yi = 1 if node uz ∈ N1(ui) and vz ∈ N2(vj),
and if (uz, vx) ∈ L. If Y =
∑n−2
i=1 Yi, the Chernoff bound implies that Pr[Y > (1+δ)E[Y ]] ≤ e−E[Y ]δ
2/4.
That is,
Pr
[
Y >
1
2p
(n− 2)p2s2l = (n− 2)ps
2l
2
]
≤ e−E[Y ]( 12p−1)2/4
= e
−2p( 1
2p
−1)23 logn ≤ 1/n3
where the last inequality comes from the fact that p < 1/6. Taking the union bound over all n(n− 1)
unordered pairs of nodes ui, vj gives the fact that w.h.p., every pair of different nodes does not have
too many similarity witnesses.
The theorem above implies that when p is sufficiently large, there is a gap between the number of
similarity witnesses of pairs of nodes that correspond to the same node and a pair of nodes that do
not correspond to the same node. Thus the first-phase similarity witnesses are enough to completely
distinguish between the correct copy of a node and possible incorrect matches.
It remains only to consider the case when p is smaller than the bound required for Theorem 1.
This requires the following useful lemma.
Lemma 2. Let B be a Bernoulli random variable, which is 1 with probability at most x, and 0
otherwise. In k independent trials, let Bi denote the outcome of the ith trial, and let B(k) =
∑k
i=1Bi:
If kx is o(1), the probability that B(k) is greater than 2 is at most k3x3/6 + o(k3x3).
Proof. The probability that B(k) is at most 2 is given by: (1−x)k+kx · (1−x)k−1+(k2)x2 · (1−x)k−2.
Using the Taylor series expansion for (1− x)k−2, this is at most 1− k3x3/6− o(k3x3).
When we run our algorithm on a graph drawn fromG(n, p), we set the minimum matching threshold
to be 3.
Lemma 3. If p ≤ 24
s2l
logn
n−2 , w.h.p., algorithm User-Matching never incorrectly matches nodes ui and
vj with i 6= j.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction the algorithm does incorrectly match two such nodes, and consider
the first time this occurs. We use Lemma 2 above. Let Bz denote the event that the vertex z is a
similarity witness for ui and vj .
In order for Bz to have occurred, we must have uz in N1(Ui) and vz in N2(vj) and (uz, vz) ∈ L.
The probability that Bz = 1 is therefore at most p
2s2. Note that each Bz is independent of the others,
and that there are n− 2 such events. As p is O(log n/n), the conditions of Lemma 2 apply, and hence
the probability that more than 2 such events occur is at most (n − 2)3p6s6. But p is O(log n/n),
and hence this event occurs with probability at most O(log6 n/n3). Taking the union bound over all
n(n−1) unordered pairs of nodes ui, vj gives the fact that w.h.p., not more than 2 similarity witnesses
can exist for any such pair. But since the minimum matching threshold for our algorithm is 3, the
algorithm does not incorrectly match this pair, contradicting our original assumption.
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Having proved that our algorithm does not make errors, we now show that it identifies most of the
graph.
Theorem 4. Our algorithm identifies 1− o(1) fraction of the nodes w.h.p.
Proof. Note that the probability that a node is identified is 1− o(1) by the Chernoff bound because in
expectation it has Ω(logn) similarity witnesses. So in expectation, we identify 1− o(1) fraction of the
nodes. Furthermore, by applying the method of bounded difference [10] (each node affects the final
result at most by 1), we get that the result holds also with high probability.
4.2 Preferential Attachment
The preferential attachment model was introduced by Baraba´si and Albert in [5]. In this paper we
consider the formal definition of the model described in [6].
Definition 2. [PA model]. Let Gmn , m being a fixed parameter, be defined inductively as follows:
• Gm1 consists of a single vertex with m self-loops.
• Gmn is built from Gmn−1 by adding a new node u together with m edges e1u = (u, v1), . . . , emu =
(u, vm) inserted one after the other in this order. Let Mi be the sum of the degrees of all the
nodes when the edge eiu is added. The endpoint vi is selected with probability
deg(vi)
Mi+1
, with the
exception of node u, which is selected with probability d(u)+1Mi+1 .
The PA model is the most celebrated model for social networks. Unlike the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model,
in which all nodes have roughly the same degree, PA graphs have a degree distribution that more
accurately resembles the skew degree distribution seen in real social networks. Though more evolved
models of social networks have been recently introduced, we focus on the PA model here because
it clearly illustrates why our algorithm works in practice. Note that the power-law distribution of
the model complicates our proofs, as the overwhelming majority of nodes only have constant degree
(≤ 2m), and so we can no longer simply apply concentration bounds to obtain results that hold w.h.p.
For a (small) constant fraction of the nodes u, there does not exist any node z such that uz ∈ N1(ui)
and vz ∈ N2(vi); we cannot hope to identify these nodes, as they have no neighbors “in common” on
the two networks. In fact, if m = 4 and s = 1/2, roughly 30% of nodes of “true” degree m will be
in this situation. Therefore, to be able to identify a reasonable fraction of the nodes, one needs m to
be at least a reasonably large constant; this is not a serious constraint, as the median friend count
on Facebook, for instance, is over 100. In our experimental section, we show that our algorithm is
effective even with smaller m.
We now outline our overall approach to identify nodes across two PA graphs. In Lemma 11, we
argue that for the nodes of very high degree, their neighborhoods are different enough that we can
apply concentration arguments and uniquely identify them. For nodes of intermediate degree (log3 n)
and less, we argue in Lemma 10 that two distinct nodes of such degree are very unlikely to have more
than 8 neighbors in common. Thus, running our algorithm with a minimum matching threshold of 9
guarantees that there are no mistakes. Finally, we prove in Lemma 12 that when we run the algorithm
iteratively, the high-degree nodes help us identify many other nodes, these nodes together with the
high-degree nodes in turn help us identify more, and so on: Eventually, the probability that any given
node is unidentified is less than a small constant, which implies that we correctly identify a large
fraction of the nodes.
Interestingly, we notice in our experiments that on real networks, the algorithm has the same
behavior as on PA graphs. In fact, as we will discuss later, the algorithm is always able to identify
high-degree/important nodes and then, using this information, identify the rest of the graph.
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Technical Results: The first of the three main lemmas we need, Lemma 11, states that we can
identify all of the high-degree nodes correctly. To prove this, we need a few technical results. These
results say that all nodes of high degree join the network early, and continue to increase their degree
significantly throughout the process; this helps us show that high-degree nodes do not share too many
neighbors.
4.2.1 High degree nodes are early-birds
Here we will prove formally that the nodes of degree Ω(log2 n) join the network very early; this will
be useful to show that two high degree nodes do not share too many neighbors.
Lemma 5. Let Gmn be the preferential attachment graph obtained after n steps. Then for any node v
inserted after time ψn, for any constant ψ > 0, dn(v) ∈ o(log2n) with high probability, where dn(v) is
the degree of nodes v at time n.
Proof. It is possible to prove that such nodes have expected constant degree, but unfortunately, it is
not trivial to get a high probability result from this observation because of the inherent dependencies
that are present in the preferential attachment model. For this reason we will not prove the statement
directly, but we will take a short detour inspired by the proof in [18]. In particular we will first break
the interval in a constant number of small intervals. Then we will show that in each interval the degree
of v will increase by at most O(log n) with high probability. Thus we will be able to conclude that at
the end of the process the total degree of v is at most O(log n)(recall that we only have a constant
number of interval).
As mentioned above we analyze the evolution of the degree of v in the interval ψn to n by splitting
this interval in a constant number of segments of length λn, for some constant λ > 0 to be fixed later.
Now we can focus on what happens to the degree of v in the interval (t, ·λn+ t] if dt(v) ≤ C log n, for
some constant C ≥ 1 and t ≥ ψn. Note that if we can prove that dλn+t ≤ C ′ log n, for some constant
C ′ ≥ 0 with probability 1 − o (n−2), we can then finish the proof by the arguments presented in the
previous paragraph.
In order to prove this, we will take a small detour to avoid the dependencies in the preferential
attachment model. More specifically, we will first show that this is true with high probability for a
random variable X for which it is easy to get the concentration result. Then we will prove that the
random variable X stochastically dominates the increase in the degree of v. Thus the result will follow.
Now, let us define X as the number of heads that we get when we toss a coin which gives head
with probability C
′ logn
t for λn times, for some constant C
′ ≥ 13C. It is possible to see that:
E[X] =
C ′ log n
t
λn ≤ C
′ log n
ψn
λn ≤ C
′λ log n
ψ
Now we fix λ = ψ100 and we use the Chernoff bound to get the following result:
Pr
(
X >
C ′ − C
2
log n
)
= Pr
(
X >
(
100(C ′ − C)
2C ′
)
E[X]
)
≤ 2−
C′
100
logn
(
100(C′−C)
2C′
)
≤ 2−
(
(6C′)
13
logn
)
≤ 2−6 logn ∈ O (n−3)
So we know that the value of X is bounded by C
′−C
2 log n with probability O
(
n−3
)
. Now, note
that until the degree of v is less than C ′ log n the probability that v increases its degree in the next
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step is stochastically dominated by the probability that we get an head when we toss a coin which
gives head with probability C
′ logn
t . To conclude our algorithm we study the probability that v become
of degree C
′ logn
t precisely at time t ≤ t∗ ≤ λn. Note that until time t∗ v has degree smaller than
C′ logn
t and so it is dominated by the coin. But we already know that when we toss such a coin at
most λn times the probability of getting C
′−C
2 log n heads is in O
(
n−3
)
. Thus for any t ≤ t∗ ≤ λn the
probability that v reach degree C ′ log n at time t∗ is O(n−3). Thus by using the union bound on all
the possible t∗, v will get to degree C ′ log n with probability O(n−2).
At this point we can finish the proof by taking the union bound on all the segments(recall that
they are constant) (ψn, ψ + λn], (ψ + λn, ψn + 2λ], · · · and on the number of nodes and we get that
all the nodes that join the network after time ψn have degree that is upper bounded by C ′′ log n for
some constant C ′′ ≥ 0 with probability O(n−1).
4.2.2 The rich get richer
In this section we study another fundamental property of the preferential attachment, which is that
nodes with degree bigger than log2 n continue to increase their degree significantly throughout the
process. More formally:
Lemma 6. Let Gmn be the preferential attachment graph obtained after n steps. Then with high
probability for any node v of degree d ≥ log2 n and for any fixed constant  ≥ 0, a 13 fraction of the
neighbors of v joined the graph after time n.
Proof. By Lemma 5 above, we know that v joined the network before time n for any fixed constant
 ≥ 0. Now we consider two cases. In the first, dn(v) ≤ 12 log2 n, in which case the statement is true
because the final degree is bigger than log2 n. Otherwise, we have that dn(v) >
1
2 log
2 n, in this case
the probability that v increase its degree at every time step after n dominates the probability that a
toss of a biased coin which gives head with probability log
2 n
2mn comes up head. Now consider the random
variable X that counts the number of heads when we toss a coin that lands head with probability
log2 n
2mn for (1− )mn times. The expected value of X is:
E[X] =
log2 n
2mn
(1− )mn = 1− 
2
log2 n
Thus using the Chernoff bound:
Pr
(
X ≤ 1− 2
2
log2 n
)
≤ exp
(
−1
2
(
1− 
1− 
)
log2 n
)
∈ O(n−2)
Thus with probability O(1−n−2) X is bigger that 1−22 log2 n but as mentioned before the increase
in the degree of v stochastically dominates X. Thus taking the union bound on all the possible v we
get that the statement holds with probability equal to O(1− n−1). Thus the claim follows.
4.2.3 First-mover advantage
Lemma 7. Let Gmn be the preferential attachment graph obtained after n steps. Then with high
probability all the nodes that join the network before time n0.3 have degree at least log3 n.
Proof. To prove this theorem we will use some results from [9], but before we need to introduce another
model equivalent to the preferential attachment. In this new process instead of constructing Gmn , we
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first construct G1nm and then we collapse the vertices 1, · · · ,m to construct the first vertex, the vertex
between m+ 1, · · · 2m to construct the second vertex and so on so for. It is not hard to see that this
new model is equivalent to the preferential attachment. Now we can prove our technical theorem.
Now we can state two useful equation from the proof of Lemma 6 in [9]. Consider the model Gnm1 .
Let Dk = dnm(v1) + dnm(v2) + · · ·+ dnm(vk), where dnm(vi) is the degree of a node inserted at time i
at time nm. Then k ≥ 1 we have:
Pr
(
|Dk − 2
√
kmn| ≥ 3
√
mn log(mn)
)
≤ (mn)−2 (1)
From the same paper we also have that if 0 ≤ d ≤ mn− k − s, we can derive from equation (23) that
Pr(dn(vk+1) = d+ 1|Dk − 2k = s) ≤ s+ d
2N − 2k − s− d (2)
From 1 we can derive that:
Pr
(
Dk − 2k ≥ 3
√
mn log(mn) + 2
√
kmn− 2k
)
≤ (mn)−2
Pr
(
Dk − 2k ≥ 5
√
kmn log(mn)
)
≤ (mn)−2
Thus we get that:
Pr(dn(vk+1) < log
3 n) =
log3 n−1∑
0
Pr(dn(vk+1) = i)
≤ Pr
(
Dk − 2k ≥ 3
√
mn log(mn) + 2
√
kmn− 2k
)
+
log3 n−1∑
i=0
5
√
kmn log(mn)∑
j=0
(
Pr (Dk − 2k = j)
Pr(dn(vk+1) = i|Dk − 2k = j)
)
≤ (mn)−2 +
log3 n−1∑
i=0
Pr
(
dn(vk+1) = i|Dk − 2k
= 5
√
mn log(mn)
)
≤ (mn)−2 +
log3 n−1∑
i=0
5
√
mn log(mn) + i− 1
2mn− 2k − 5√mn log(mn)− i+ 1
∈ O
(
log4(n)√
n
)
where we assumed that k ∈ O
(
n
1
3
)
.
So now by union bounding on the first mn0.3 nodes we obtain that with high probability in Gnm1
all the nodes have degree bigger than log2 n. But this implies in turn the statement of the theorem
by construction of Gnm1 .
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4.2.4 Handling product of generalized harmonic
Lemma 8. Let a and b be constant greater than 0. Then:
nb−2∑
i=na
nb−1∑
j>i
nb∑
z>j
1
i2j2z2
∈ O
(
1
n3a
)
Proof. Recall that
∑y
k=x
1
k2
∈ Θ( 1x − 1y ). Then
nb−2∑
i=na
nb−1∑
j>i
nb∑
z>j
1
i2j2z2
=
nb−2∑
i=na
1
i2
nb−1∑
j>i
1
j2
nb∑
z>j
1
z2
∈ Θ( 1
na
− 1
nb
)Θ(
1
na
− 1
nb
)Θ(
1
na
− 1
nb
)
∈ O
(
1
n3a
)
Completing the Proof: We now use the technical lemmas above to complete our proof for the
preferential attachment model.
Lemma 9. For a node u with degree d, the probability that it is incident to a node arriving at time i
is at most max{d, log3 n}/(i− 1) w.h.p.
Proof. If node i arrives after u, the probability that i is adjacent to u is at most the given value, since
there are m(i− 1) edges existing in the graph already, and we take the union bound over the m edges
incident to i. If i arrives before u, let t denote the time at which u arrives. From Lemma 6 of [9], the
degree of i at t is at most
√
ti log3 n w.h.p.. But there are (t− 1)m edges already in the graph at this
time, and since u has m edges incident to it, the probability that one of them is incident to i is at
most log3 n
√
t√
i(t−1) ≤ log
3 n/(i− 1).
Lemma 10. W.h.p, for any pair of nodes u, v of degree < log3 n, |N(u) ∩N(v)| ≤ 8.
Proof. From Lemma 7, nodes u and v must have arrived after time t = n0.3. Let a, b be constants such
that 0.3 < a < b < 1 and b ≤ 3/2a−ε for some constant ε > 0. We first show that the probability that
any two nodes u, v with degree less than log3 n and arriving before time nb have 3 or more common
neighbors between na and nb is at most n−ε. This implies that, setting a to 0.3, nodes u and v have
at most 2 neighbors between na and n3a/2−ε, at most 2 between n3a/2−ε and n9a/4, and at most 2
between n9a/4 and n27a/8 > n, for a total of 6 overall. Similarly, we show that u and v have at most 2
neighbors arriving before n0.3, which completes the lemma.
From Lemma 9 above, the probability that a node arriving at time i is incident to u and v is at most
(log3 n/(i−1))2. (The events are not independent, but they are negatively correlated.) The probability
that 3 nodes i, j, k are all incident to both u and v, then, is at most (log3 n)6/((i− 1)(j − 1)(k− 1))2.
Therefore, for a fixed u, v, the probability that some 3 nodes are adjacent to u and v is at most:
log18 n
nb∑
i=na
nb∑
j=na
nb∑
k=na
1
((i− 1)(j − 1)(k − 1))2
≤ log18 n
(
1
na
− 1
nb
)3
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There are at most nb choices for each of u and v; taking the union bound, the probability that any
pair u, v have 3 or more neighbors in common is at most n2b−3a log18 n = n−2ε log18 n.
So, by setting the matching threshold to 9, the algorithm never makes errors; we now prove that
it actually detects a lot of good new links.
Lemma 11. The algorithm successfully identifies any node of degree ≥ 4 log2 n/(s2l).
Proof. For any node v of degree d(v) ≥ 4 log2 n/(s2l), the expected number of similarity witnesses it
has with its copy during the first phase is d(v)s2l; using the Chernoff Bound, the probability that the
number is less than 7/8 of its expectation is at most exp(−d(v)s2l/128) ≤ exp(− log2 n/32) = 1
nlogn/32
.
Therefore, with very high probability, every node v of degree d(v) has at least 7/8 · d(v)s2l first-phase
similarity witnesses with its copy.
On the other hand, how many similarity witnesses can node v have with a copy of a different node
u? Fix ε > 0, and first consider potential similarity witnesses that arrive before time t = εn; later,
we consider those that arrive after this time. From Lemma 6, we have dt(v) ≤ (2/3 + ε)d(v). Even
if all of these neighbors of v are also incident to u, the expected number of similarity witnesses for
(u, v) is at most dt(v)s
2l. Now consider the neighbors of v that arrive after time εn. Each of these
nodes is a neighbor of u with probability ≤ d(u)/(2mεn). But d(u) ≤ O˜(√n), and hence each of
the neighbors of v is a neighbor of u with probability o(1/n1/2−δ). Therefore, the expected number
of similarity witnesses for (u, v) among these nodes is at most d(v)s2l/n1/2−δ. Therefore, the total
expected number of similarity witnesses is at most (2/3 + ε)d(v)s2l. Again using the Chernoff Bound,
the probability that this is at least 7/8 ·d(v)s2l is at most exp(−3/4d(v)s2l ·/64) = exp(−3 log2 n/64),
which is at most 1
n3 logn/64
.
To conclude, we showed that with very high probability, a high-degree node v has at least 7/8 ·
d(v)s2l first-phase similarity witnesses with its copy, and has fewer than this number of witnesses to
the copy of any other node. Therefore, our algorithm correctly identifies all high-degree nodes.
From the two preceding lemmas, we identify all the high-degree nodes, and make no mistakes on
the low-degree nodes. It therefore remains only to show that we have a good success probability for
the low-degree nodes. In the lemma below, we show this when ms2 ≥ 22. We note that one still
obtains good results even with a higher or lower value of ms2, but it appears difficult to obtain a
simple closed-form expression for the fraction of identified nodes. For ease of exposition, we present
the case of ms2 ≥ 22 here, but the proof generalizes in the obvious way.
Lemma 12. Suppose ms2 ≥ 22. Then, w.h.p., we successfully identify at least 97% of the nodes.
Proof. We have already seen that all high-degree nodes (those arriving before time n0.3) are identified
in the first phase of the algorithm. Note also that it never makes a mistake; it therefore remains
only to identify the lower-degree nodes. We describe a sequence of iterations in which we bound the
probability of failing to identify other nodes.
Consider a sequence of roughly n0.75 iterations, in each of which we analyze n0.25 nodes. In
particular, iteration i contains all nodes that arrived between time n0.3 + (i− 1)n0.25 and time n0.3 +
i · n0.25. We argue inductively that after iteration i, w.h.p. the fraction of nodes belonging to this
iteration that are not identified is less than 0.03, and the total fraction of degree incident to unidentified
nodes is less than 0.08. Since this is true for each i, we obtain the lemma.
The base case of nodes arriving before n0.3 has already been handled. Now, note that during any
iteration, the total degree incident to nodes of this iteration is at most 2mn0.25  n0.3. Thus, when
each node of this iteration, the probability that any of its m edges is incident to another node of this
iteration is less than 0.01.
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Consider any of the m edges incident to a given node of this iteration. For each edge, we say it is
good if it survives in both copies of the graph, and is incident to an identified node from a previous
iteration. Thus, the probability that an edge is good is at least s2 · (0.99× 0.92). Since ms2 > 22, the
expected number of good edges is greater than 20. The node will be identified if at least 8 of its edges
are good; applying the Chernoff bound, the probability that a given node is unidentified is at most
exp(−3.606) < 0.02717.
Since this is true for each node of this iteration, regardless of the outcomes for previous nodes of
the iteration, we can apply concentration inequalities even though the events are not independent. In
particular, the number of identified nodes stochastically dominates the number of successes in n0.25
independent Bernoulli trials with probability 1 − exp(−3.606) (see, for example, Theorem 1.2.17 of
[21]). Again applying the Chernoff Bound, the probability that the fraction of unidentified nodes
exceeds 0.03 is at most exp(0.27n0.25 ∗0.01/4), which is negligible. To complete the induction, we need
to show that the fraction of total degree incident to unidentified nodes is at most 0.08. To observe
this, note that the increase in degree is 2mn0.25; the unidentified fraction increases if the new nodes
are unidentified (but we have seen the expected contribution here is at most 0.02717mn0.25), or if the
“other” endpoint is another node of this iteration (at most 0.01mn0.25), or if the “other” endpoint is
an unidentified node (in expectation, at most 0.08mn0.25). Again, a simple concentration argument
completes the proof.
5 Experiments
In this section we analyze the performance of our algorithm in different experimental settings. The
main goal of this section is to answer the following eight questions:
• Are our theorems robust? Do our results depend on the constants that we use or are they more
general?
• How does the algorithm scale on very large graphs?
• Does our algorithm work only for an underlying “real” network generated by a random process
such as Preferential Attachment, or does it work for real social networks?
• How does the algorithm perform when the two networks to be matched are not generated by
independently deleting edges, but by a different process like a cascade model?
• How does the algorithm perform when the two networks to be matched have different scopes?
Is the algorithm robust to highly correlated edge deletion?
• Does our model capture reality well? In more realistic scenarios, with distinct but similar graphs,
does the algorithm perform acceptably?
• How does our algorithm perform when the network is under attack? Can it still have high
precision? Is it easy for an adversary to trick our algorithm?
• How important is it to bucket nodes by degree? How big is the impact on the algorithm’s
precision? How does our algorithm compare with a simple algorithm that just counts the number
of common neighbors?
To answer these eight questions, we designed 4 different experiments using 6 different publicly
available data sets. These experiments are increasingly challenging for our algorithm, which performs
well in all cases, showing its robustness. Before entering into the details of the experiments, we de-
scribe briefly the basic datasets used in the paper. We use synthetic random graphs generated by
the Preferential Attachment [5], Affiliation Network [19], and RMAT [7] processes; we also consider
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Network Number of nodes Number of edges
PA [5] 1,000,000 20,000,000
RMAT24 [7] 8,871,645 520,757,402
RMAT26 [7] 32,803,311 2,103,850,648
RMAT28 [7] 121,228,778 8,472,338,793
AN [19] 60,026 8,069,546
Facebook [30] 63,731 1,545,686
DBLP [1] 4,388,906 2,778,941
Enron [16] 36,692 367,662
Gowalla [8] 196,591 950,327
French Wikipedia [2] 4,362,736 141,311,515
German Wikipedia [2] 2,851,252 81,467,497
Table 1: The original 11 datasets.
Network Number of nodes Relative running time
RMAT24 8871645 1
RMAT26 32803311 1.199
RMAT28 121228778 12.544
Table 2: The relative running time of the algorithm on three RMAT graphs as a function of numbers
of nodes in the graph.
an early snapshot of the Facebook graph [30], a snapshot of DBLP [1], the email network of En-
ron [16], a snapshot of Gowalla [8] (a social network with location information), and Wikipedia in two
languages [2]. In Table 1 we report some general statistics on the networks.
Robustness of our Theorems: To answer the first question, we use as an underlying graph the
preferential attachment graph described above, with 1,000,000 nodes and m = 20. We analyze the
performance of our algorithm when we delete edges with probability s = 0.5 and with different seed
link probabilities. The main goal of this experiment is to show that the values of m, s needed in our
proof are only required for the calculations; the algorithm is effective even with much lower values.
With the specified parameters, for the majority of nodes, the expected number of neighbors in the
intersection of both graphs is 5. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 2, our algorithm performs remarkably
well, making zero errors regardless of the seed link probability. Further, it recovers almost the entire
graph. Unsurprisingly, lowering the threshold for our algorithm increases recall, but it is interesting
to note that in this setting, it does not affect precision at all.
Efficiency of our algorithms: Here we tested our algorithms with datasets of increasing size. In
particular we generate 3 synthetic random graphs of increasing size using the RMAT random model.
Then we use the three graphs as the underlying “real” networks and we generate 6 graphs from them
with edges surviving with probability 0.5. Finally we analyze the running time of our algorithm with
seed link probability equal to 0.10. As shown in Table 2, using the same amount of resources, the
running time of the algorithm increases by at most a factor 12.544 between the smallest and the largest
graph.
Robustness to other models of the underlying graph: For our third question, we move away
from synthetic graphs, and consider the snapshots of Facebook and the Enron email networks as our
initial underlying networks. For Facebook, edges survive either with probability s = 0.5 or s = 0.75,
and we analyze performance of our algorithm with different seed link probabilities. For Enron, which
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Figure 2: The number of corrected pairs detected with different threshold for the preferential at-
tachment model with random deletion. The precision is not shown in the plot because it is always
100%.
is a much sparser network, we delete the edges with probability s = 0.5 and analyze performance of
our algorithm with seed link probability equal to 0.10. The main goal of these experiments is to show
that our algorithm has good performance even outside the boundary of our theoretical results even
when the underlying network is not generated by a random model.
In the first experiment with Facebook, when edges survive with probability 0.75, there are 63584
nodes with degree at least 1 in both networks.4 In the second, with edges surviving with probability
0.5, there are 62854 nodes with this property. In this case, the results are also very strong; see Table 3.
Roughly 28% of nodes have extremely low degree (≤ 5), and so our algorithm cannot obtain recall as
high as in the previous setting. However, we identify a very large fraction of the roughly 45250 nodes
with degree above 5, and the precision is still remarkably good; in all cases, the error is well under
1%. Table 2 presents the full results for the harder case, with edge survival probability 0.5. With
edge survival probability 0.75 (not shown in the table), performance is even better: At threshold 2
and the lowest seed link probability of 5%, we correctly identify 46626 nodes and incorrectly identify
20, an error rate of well under 0.05%. In the case of Enron, the original email network is very sparse,
with an average degree of approximately 20; this means that each copy has average degree roughly
10, which is much sparser than real social networks. Of the 36,692 original nodes, only 21,624 exist
in the intersection of the two copies; over 18,000 of these have degree ≤ 5, and the average degree is
just over 4. Still, with matching threshold 5, we identify almost all the nodes of degree 5 and above,
and even in this very sparse graph, the error rate among newly identified nodes is 4.8%.
Robustness to different deletion models: We now turn our attention to the fourth question:
How much do our results depend on the process by which the two copies are generated? To answer
this, we analyze a different model where we generate the two copies of the underlying graph using
the Independent Cascade Model of [12]. More specifically, we construct a graph starting from one
seed node in the underlying social network and we add to the graph the neighbors of the node with
probability p = 0.05. Subsequently, every time we add a node, we consider all its neighbors and add
4Note that we can only detect nodes which have at least degree 1 in both networks
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Pr Threshold 5 Threshold 4 Threshold 2
Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
20% 23915 0 28527 53 41472 203
10% 23832 49 32105 112 38752 213
5% 11091 43 28602 118 36484 236
Pr Threshold 5 Threshold 4 Threshold 3
Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
10% 3426 61 3549 90 3666 149
Table 3: Results for Facebook (Left) and Enron (Right) under the random deletion model. Pr denotes
the seed link probability.
Figure 3: The number of corrected pairs detected with different threshold for the two Facebook graphs
generated by the Independent Cascade Model. The plot does not show precision, since it is always
100%.
each of them independently with probability p = 0.05 (note that we can try to add a node to the
graph multiple times).
The results in this cascade model are extremely good; in fact, for both Facebook and Enron we
have 0 errors; as shown for Facebook in Figure 3, we are able to identify almost all the nodes in the
intersection of the two graphs (even at seed link prob. 5%, we identify 16, 273/16533 = 98.4%).
Robustness to correlated edge deletion: We now analyze one of the most challenging scenarios
for our algorithm where, independently in the two realizations of the social network, we delete all or
none of the edges in a community. For this purpose, we consider the Affiliation Networks model [19]
as the underlying real network. In this model, a bipartite graph of users and interests is constructed
using a preferential attachment-like process and then two users are connected in the network if and
only if they share an interest (for the model details, refer to [19]). To generate the two copies in our
experiment, we delete the interests independently in each copy with probability 0.25, and then we
generate the graph using only the surviving interests. Note that in this setting, the same node in the
two realizations can have very different neighbors. Still, our algorithm has very high precision and
recall, as shown in Table 4.
Real world scenarios: Now we move to the most challenging case, where the two graphs are no
longer generated by a mathematical process that makes 2 imperfect copies of the same underlying
network. For this purpose, we conduct two types of experiments. First, we use the DBLP and the
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Pr Threshold 4 Threshold 3 Threshold 2
Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
10% 54770 0 55863 0 55942 0
Table 4: Results for the Affiliation Networks model under correlated edge deletion probability.
Gowalla datasets in which each edge is annotated with a time, and construct 2 networks by taking
edges in disjoint time intervals. Then we consider the French- and German-language Wikipedia link
graph.
From the co-authorship graph of DBLP, the first network is generated by considering only the
publications written in even years, and the second is generated by considering only the publications
written in odd years. Gowalla is a social network where each user could also check-in to a location
(each check-in has an associated timestamp). Using this information we generate two Gowalla graphs;
in the first graph, we have an edge between nodes if they are friends and if and only if they check-in to
approximately the same location in an odd month. In the second, we have an edge between nodes if
they are friends and if and only if they check-in in approximately the same location in an even month.
Note that for both DBLP and Gowalla, the two constructed graphs have a different set of nodes
and edges, with correlations different from the previous independent deletion models. Nevertheless we
will see that the intersection is big enough to retrieve a good part of the networks.
In DBLP, there are 380, 129 nodes in the intersection of the two graphs, but the considerable
majority of them have extremely low degree. Over 310K have degree less than 5 in the intersection
of the two graphs, and so again we cannot hope for extremely high recall. However, we do find
considerably more nodes than in the input set. We start with a 10% probability of seed links, resulting
in 32087 seeds; however, note that most of these have extremely low degree, and hence are not very
useful. As shown in table 5, we have nearly 69, 000 nodes identified, with an error rate of under 4.17%.
Note that we identify over half the nodes of degree at least 11, and a considerably larger fraction of
those with higher degree. We include a plot showing precision and recall for nodes of various degrees
(Figure 4).
For Gowalla, there are 38103 nodes in the intersection of the two graphs, of which over 32K have
degree ≤ 5. We start with 3800 seeds, of which most are low-degree and hence not useful. We identify
over 4000 of the (nearly 6000) nodes of degree above 5, with an error rate of 3.75%. See Table 5 and
Figure 4 for more details.
Finally for a still more challenging scenario, we consider a case where the 2 networks do not have
any common source, but yet may have some similarity in their structure. In particular, we consider
the case of the French- and German-language Wikipedia sites, which have 4.36M and 2.85M nodes
respectively. Wikipedia also maintains a set of inter-language links, which connect corresponding
articles in a pair of languages; for French and German, there are 531710 links, corresponding to
only 12.19% of the French articles. The relatively small number of links illustrates the extent of the
difference between the French and German networks. Starting with 10% of the inter-language links
as seeds, we are able to nearly triple the number of links (including finding a number of new links
not in the input inter-language set), with an error rate of 17.5% in new links. However, some of these
mistakes are due to human errors in Wikipedia’s inter-language links, while others mistake French
articles to closely connected German ones; for instance, we link the French article for Lee Harvey
Oswald (the assassin of President Kennedy) to the German article on the assassination.
Robustness to attack: We now turn our attention to a very challenging question: what is the
performance of our algorithm when the network is under attack? In order to answer this question, we
again consider the Facebook network as the underlying social network, and from it we generate two
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Pr Threshold 5 Threshold 4 Threshold 2
Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
10 42797 58 53026 641 68641 2985
Pr Threshold 5 Threshold 4 Threshold 2
Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
10 5520 29 5917 48 7931 155
Pr Threshold 5 Threshold 3
Good Bad Good Bad
10 108343 9441 122740 14373
Table 5: Results for DBLP (Top Left), Gowala (Top Right), and Wikipedia (Bottom)
Figure 4: Precision and Recall vs. Degree Distribution for Gowala (left) and DBLP (right).
realizations with edge probability 0.75. Then, in order to simulate an attack, in each network for each
node v we create a malicious copy of it, w, and for each node u connected to v in the network (that is,
u ∈ N(v)), we add the edge (u,w) independently with probability 0.5. Note that this is a very strong
attack model (it assumes that users will accept a friend request from a ’fake’ friend with probability
0.5), and is designed to circumvent our matching algorithm. Nevertheless when we run our algorithm
with seed link probability equal to 0.1, and with threshold equal to 2 we notice that we are still able
to align a very large fraction of the two networks with just a few errors (46955 correct matches and
114 wrong matches, out of 63731 possible good matches).
Importance of degree bucketing, comparison with straightforward algorithm: We now
consider our last question: How important is it to bucket nodes by degree? How big is the impact
on the algorithm’s precision? How does our algorithm compare with a straightforward algorithm that
just counts the number of common neighbors? To answer this question, we run a few experiments.
First, we consider the Facebook graph with edge survival probability 0.5 and seed link probability 5%,
and we repeat the experiments again without using the degree bucketing and with threshold equal 1.
In this case we observe that the number of bad matching increases by a factor of 50% without any
significant change in the number of good matchings.
Then we consider other two interesting scenarios: How does this simple algorithm perform on Face-
book under attack? And how does it perform on matching Wikipedia pages? Those two experiments
show two weaknesses of this simple algorithm. More precisely, in the first case the simple algorithm
obtains 100% precision but its recall is very low. It is indeed able to reconstruct less than half of
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the number of matches found by our algorithm (22346 vs 46955). On the other hand, the second
setting shows that the precision of this simple algorithm can be very low. Specifically, the error rate
of the algorithm is 27.87%, while our algorithm has error rate only 17.31%. In this second setting (for
Wikipedia) the recall is also very low, less than 13.52%; there are 71854 correct matches, of which
most (53174) are seed links, and 7216 wrong matches.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we present the first provably good algorithm for social network reconciliation. We show
that in well-studied models of social networks, we can identify almost the entire network, with no
errors. Surprisingly, the perfect precision of our algorithm holds even experimentally in synthetic
networks. For the more realistic data sets, we still identify a very large fraction of the nodes with
very low error rates. Interesting directions for future work include extending our theoretical results to
more network models and validating the algorithm on different and more realistic data sets.
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